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Secularity, Religion and the Possibilities  
for Religious Citizenship
Lyn Parker and Chang-Yau Hoon
The University of Western Australia, and Singapore Management University
Abstract
Scholarly predictions of the secularization of the world have proven premature. We see a 
heterogeneous world in which religion remains a significant and vital social and political force. 
This paper reflects critically upon secularization theory in order to see how scholars can 
productively respond to the, at least partly, religious condition of the world at the beginning of 
the twenty first century. We note that conventional multiculturalism theory and policy neglects 
religion, and argue the need for a reconceptualization of understanding of religion and secularity, 
particularly in a context of multicultural citizenship — such as in Australia and Indonesia. We 
consider the possibilities for religious pluralism in citizenship and for “religious citizenship”. 
Finally, we propose that religious citizenship education might be a site for fostering a tolerant 
and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity.
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Introduction
The premise of this paper is that, contra secularization theory, “religion” has not 
dissolved in the modern world. On the contrary, we see a heterogeneous world 
in which religion remains a significant and vital social and political force, and an 
aspect of plural modernities. Some countries, such as Australia, are broadly but 
unevenly secular, with pockets of religiosity; in many societies, the world is still, 
to use Weber’s phrase, “a great enchanted garden” (1963 [1922]:270), and people 
live their lives enmeshed within a religious worldview; other societies, such as 
in Indonesia, are undergoing a process of re-conversion. Scholarly predictions 
of the secularization of the world have proven premature. Secularization 
theory, perhaps most famously put forward by Berger in The Sacred Canopy 
(1969 [1967]), posits that modernity, with its capitalist and individualist ethos, 
and rational values, will be a secular modernity: the force of religion as the 
Published in Asian Journal of Social Science, 2013, 41(2), pp. 150-174.
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hegemonic worldview will decline, and religion will be consigned to a small, 
private world. However, there is almost a sub-genre of revision, resistance and 
refutation of secularization theory (e.g. Berger, 1999a; Casanova, 1994; Chaves, 
1994; Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000). This paper is an attempt to critically 
reflect upon secularization theory and the arguments of its modifiers and 
resistors, to bring about a genuine response to the, at least partly, religious 
condition of the world at the beginning of the twenty first century.1
We begin by outlining the major features of secularization theory, along the 
way identifying the many variations on the theme. We then survey the condi-
tion of the world, showing the failure of secularization theory to identify con-
tinuing and resurgent religiosity in the contemporary world. We explore the 
cases of religious Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, 
and neigbouring, broadly secular, Australia, to exemplify the diversity of the 
global religious landscape. Through our long-term ethnographic experience of 
Indonesia, our lived experience as residents of Australia, and a review of cur-
rent events in these two countries in the light of the literature on multicultural-
ism, we consider the possibilities for religious pluralism in citizenship and for 
“religious citizenship” in both religious and broadly secular societies. We note 
that Western multiculturalism, in theory and policy, neglects religion; yet in 
countries like Australia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, there are aggrieved religious minorities. We argue that there is a 
need for a reconceptualization of multiculturalism such that it incorporates 
understanding of the need for peaceful co-existence of religiosity, minority 
religions and secularity. We also caution that “tolerance” invokes the power of 
the powerful to define the barbarism of the religious, ethnicized, irrational 
‘Other’. Finally, we propose that religious citizenship education might be a site 
for fostering a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity.
Secularization: Theme and Variations
From the 1960s, secularization theory was the prevailing model for how the 
world would “deal with” religion under conditions of modernization. Weber’s 
1904–05 essay on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930) and his 
later The Sociology of Religion (1963 [1922]) proposed that the values of Protes-
tantism and advanced capitalism would bring about the “disenchantment” of 
the world. His proposal was developed and refined by scholars such as Parsons 
1 This paper is part of a larger project, “Education for a Tolerant and Multicultural Indonesia”, 
which is financed by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP0984683).
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(1966) and Luckmann (1967), and by Berger (1969 [1967]).2 They saw religion as 
a social construction that is shared and internalized by individuals, thus pro-
viding a “canopy” of explanations and meanings that shelters individuals, and 
hence society, from the potential destructiveness of chaotic, arbitrary exis-
tence. In The Sacred Canopy, Berger proposed that the twin forces of secular-
ization and pluralism were in a dialectical relationship that created modernity: 
secularization generates pluralism, by destroying the transcendental authority 
of established religion, and pluralism relativizes religion, weakening its taken-
for-grantedness and claims to hegemonic and unique truth. Both worked to 
“hollow out” the “sacred canopy”.
This cluster of work became known as “secularization theory” and became 
the accepted paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) by which the nature and development of 
advanced capitalist society were explained. “Protestantism divested itself as 
much as possible from the three most ancient and most powerful concomi-
tants of the sacred — mystery, miracle, and magic. This process has been aptly 
caught in the phrase ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, ‘Entzauberung der 
Welt’)” (Berger, 1969 [1967]:111).
Although there are various aspects to the theory, the backbone of secular-
ization theory, and the most important component for our purposes, is “dif-
ferentiation theory”. Differentiation theory is “the conceptualization of the 
process of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation 
and emancipation of the secular spheres — primarily the state, the economy, 
and science — from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation 
and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere” 
(Casanova, 1994:19). Differentiation produced the disenchantment of the 
world, the separation of religion and state, and the development of com-
parative autonomy for political, education, scientific, economic and other 
institutions from religious authority and institutions. Differentiation is the 
component of secularization theory that is usually credited with the most 
validity (Casanova, 1994).
Other aspects of secularization theory that are relevant here include the 
privatization of religious belief, such that “Religion manifests itself as public 
rhetoric and private virtue” (Berger, 1969 [1967]:133).3 Secularization theory 
2 Berger has recanted and published an edited book on this subject (1999a). In this book, 
Berger uses the term desecularization, which implies that a process of secularization did occur, 
while others claim that the world never was disenchanted (e.g. Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 
2000).
3 Other aspects of secularization theory include the transformation of religious institutions 
into secular institutions — e.g. educational institutions, such as universities, that in medieval 
times were religious institutions are now secular institutions — and the transfer of social 
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allows that under conditions of modernity, religious belief can still thrive at the 
level of the individual, and family, but posits that the number and proportion 
of people who say they believe in God, practise religious rituals, attend reli-
gious worship, belong to religious organizations, and so on, decline with 
modernity.4 Chaves modifies the claims for secularization theory at the level of 
the individual by proposing that,
the relevant questions about the scope of religious authority over individuals are ques-
tions about the extent to which actions are regulated by religious authority . . . Hence, 
data about religious intermarriage, religious authority’s attempted control over repro-
ductive behaviour, diets, voting, etc. are much more relevant to debates about secular-
ization than are data about belief in God or church membership (1994:768).
One of the ramifications of the individualization of religion is that the source 
of religious belief is the consciousness of the individual, rather than the shared, 
inter-subjective reality previously taken for granted. The concomitant of the 
individualization of religion is that religion becomes a matter of choice for 
the individual (or the family), rather than the means by which the members 
of a society share a common understanding of the nature of the world. This 
is what is behind Charles Taylor’s question, how is “being religious” differ-
ent in the year 1500 — i.e. in the medieval world in the West — and in the 
year 2000 (2007:13)?
Secularization brings the de-monopolization of religion per se, as well as the 
de-monopolization of particular religious traditions, a decline in religious 
authority at many levels (Chaves, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1999), and the development 
of a pluralistic, competitive situation in which the allegiance of followers 
cannot be taken for granted. Particular religious traditions compete not only 
with one another but also with other truth-claims, communities and ideologies 
for the “choice” of potential followers. For the purposes of our paper, the idea 
that “secularization ipso facto leads to a pluralistic situation” (Berger, 1969 
responsibilities from religious authorities to state authorities, e.g. hospitals and orphanages. 
Some scholars have focused on the reduced role of religious elites and authorities under 
conditions of modernity. Some scholars have stressed the rise of science as a new ideational 
system that makes claims for absolute truth: a minority sees science as a new religion; others see 
science as quite different from religion because it does not ultimately rely on faith. 
4 There is (probably rightly) considerable imprecision in this aspect of the theory, in that 
advocates of secularization theory do not postulate the percentage of the society that would be 
needed to be able to label a society as “secular” or “predominantly secular”. A popular measure is 
the percentage of individuals who attend church each week (for Christianity) or pray five times 
daily (for Islam); commonly, survey data about downward shifts in these percentages are put 
forward as evidence of secularization.
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[1967]:135; Berger, 2012) is important, not because it insists upon the separation 
of church (sic) and state, but because religious minorities require protection 
from the potential of a religious majority, in a position of political dominance 
or hegemony in the state, to impose religious oppression (Khan, 2004). That is, 
secularization encourages a religious majority to feel their fortunate position 
of power as conditional, ephemeral and relative, while providing religious 
minorities with a moral framework that encourages freedom and protection. 
Nevertheless, secularization has not solved problems of conflict (between 
followers of different religions, or indeed among followers of a religion).
Religion in the Contemporary World
Against the secularization thesis, anthropology has shown that in all societies 
“the quest for meaning that transcends the restricted space of empirical exis-
tence in this world, has been a perennial feature of humanity. (This is not a 
theological statement but an anthropological one . . .)” (Berger, 1999b:13). 
Indeed, the growth in the number of adherents of major religions in recent 
decades raises significant questions about the secularization thesis. However, 
this increase has not been even across the board. Here we briefly survey some 
major trends of religion in the contemporary world.
With the decline of Communism, religious activities proliferated in Russia 
following the reinstatement of the Orthodox Church, as well as in China after 
the Roman Catholic Church was instated, resulting in what some have termed 
the “re-sacralization” of these societies (Turner, 2007:258; Tham, 2008:16). Chris-
tianity has experienced an explosive growth in developing countries. Ironi-
cally, it has not been the more secularized and liberal denominations that have 
grown, but rather their more conservative counterparts — it has been those 
which believe in supernatural faith, miracles, infallible scriptural authority and 
evangelism that have been ascendant (Miller and Yamamori, 2007:36). This new 
strand of Christianity, referred to as the Pentecostal or charismatic movement, 
is remarkably different to the more established and institutionalized traditional 
denominations. Tham argues that the rise of this movement is a reaction to 
secularization on the one hand, and a demonstration of the failure of institu-
tional religions to meet the emotional needs of their followers on the other. He 
maintains that the hyper-rationalism and disenchantment brought about by 
secularization has deprived individuals of “transcendent perspectives” which 
give meaning and purpose to their lives (2008:23). Furthermore, secularization 
and modernization have limited the role of institutional religion in the pub-
lic sphere. As a result, a religious “market place” has been created as the new 
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 religious movement attempts to “re-institute the sacred canopy” and “grapple 
with the demands of modernization and secularization” (Tham, 2008:24).
Another backlash against rampant secularity has been evident in the United 
States. Here the religious right (made up mainly of charismatic, evangelical 
Christians, as well as other conservative and fundamentalist Christian 
denominations, traditional Catholics and orthodox Jews) enjoyed significant 
influence in politics and public policy, at least until recently. They united 
around issues like abortion, gay marriage, stem cell research, and terrorism. 
Most commentators exclude the US from the secularization phenomenon.
However, in Australia and Western Europe, church attendance continues to 
fall and these societies are usually said to be secular societies. Australia is a 
country of increasing secularity. Censuses in Australia routinely ask about 
religious affiliation, but it is an optional question. The instruction “if no religion, 
write none” was introduced in 1971. This saw a seven-fold increase from the 
previous census year in the percentage of persons stating they had no religion. 
Since 1971 this percentage has progressively increased to about 22% in the 2011 
Census (ABS, 2012). Nevertheless, Australia is also a country of immigrants, and 
the small minority religions of Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism are the fastest 
growing categories (ABS, 2012).5 There is also a movement of Pentecostalism, 
as well as an amorphous rise in New Age and spiritualist beliefs (e.g. ABS, 2012; 
Tacey, 2000; Tacey, 2003).
In the United Kingdom, parish churches are losing their sense of prominence 
within the public sphere (Percy, 2004). Although secularization and the “laws 
of man” (sic) seem to have prevailed in the legalization of gay marriage in some 
European countries like Spain and the Netherlands, issues pertaining to 
religion have not disappeared. With a growing migrant Muslim minority, 
secular societies in Europe are confronted with religious issues in the public 
sphere such as the controversial head scarf affair in France and the Rushdie 
affair in Britain (Bowen, 2007; Werbner, 2002). In some countries, there is the 
perception among dominant secular elites that Islam seeks to be a religion of 
the public sphere, contesting laicité. Hence, Islam is positioned as a “public 
religion, . . . the underlying social machine incorporating all spheres of action 
and, specifically, political arenas into the cultural web. Secularism, on the other 
hand, appears as the opposite pole, as the virtual abolition of religion in the 
domain of politics and public life” (Nökel and Stauth, 2005:256).
5 In response to the 2011 Census questions, stated religious affiliations were: 25% Catholic, 17% 
Anglican, 19% other Christian denominations, 22% “no religion” and 7% non-Christian religions 
(note: does not add to 100%, due to inadequate descriptions and non-answers) (ABS, 2012). 
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However, the global resurgence of Islam has occurred predominantly among 
already-Muslim communities — that is, it is a revitalized expression of Muslim 
identity and piety, above all evident in Muslim everyday practice. However, 
the aspect which has captured most media and government attention has 
been the eruption of Islamist demands for political power, not just through 
conventional political processes, including the ballot box (e.g. Algeria, Turkey, 
and Palestine), but also through violent Islamist terrorism. These opposite 
poles of Islamization — heightened religious piety and Islamist extremism — 
are nowhere more obvious than in Indonesia. Public discourse in Indonesia is 
now highly Islamized, and civil practices such as jilbab-wearing have become 
de rigeur for Muslims (see, e.g. Fealy and White, 2008). At the same time, 
Muslim extremists have successfully instituted a series of violent attacks on 
Western targets (notably in Jakarta and Bali), as well as intervened violently in 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, e.g. in Ambon (see e.g. Hasan, 2010; 
ICG, 2002a; ICG, 2002b; ICG, 2006).
Scholars caution against seeing the Islamic resurgence as purely a reaction 
to the dominance of European civilization or Western modernity, but, as Asad 
(1993) reminds us, it is not possible to view Islam or any other religion as an 
island. Certainly, globally, there have been political events since the 1960s — 
most recently the Taliban rule of Afghanistan and then invasion by the US, and 
the invasion of Iraq by the US — that have been instrumental in producing 
“political Islam”.6
There is no doubt that these events have all contributed to a hypersensitivity 
among Muslims of their identity and place in the world, but it is important 
not to allow world political events to hijack understanding of the religious 
nature of this movement. The Islamic resurgence is a rediscovery of what it 
means to be a Muslim: how to live as a member of a moral, religious Islamic 
community, how to behave under modern conditions — which might mean 
living in a non-Islamic community — and the meaning of religion in one’s 
individual life. The Islamic resurgence has not only attempted to create better 
Muslims, but has also “provided people with a source of pride and personal 
identity” (Thomas, 1988:904).
6 An-Na’im (1999:103) comments, “Political Islam can be broadly defined as the mobilization 
of Islamic identity in pursuit of particular objectives of public policy, both within an Islamic 
society and in its relations with other societies. . . .  In fact, the mobilization of Islamic identity 
toward such goals can be seen as integral to the legitimate right of Muslim peoples to self-
determination.”
The coming to power, democratically, of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is one instance of 
the successful institutionalization of political Islam.
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The Need to Consider Religion in Multicultural Citizenship — the Cases of 
Indonesia and Australia
Having established that the secularization thesis underestimated the need for 
religion under conditions of modernity, and that religiosity is prevalent in the 
contemporary world, here we aim to show that there is a need to acknowledge 
this religiosity, even in so-called secular nation-states such as Australia. We are 
looking at new ways for religious people to belong to larger polities, such as 
nation-states, in a modern world, and at new ways for nation-states to acknowl-
edge and value the religiosity (as well as non-religiosity) of their citizens.
Here we move from a global overview to two very different but neighbour-
ing countries, Indonesia and Australia, the better to ground our argument. 
These two countries represent two very different versions of multiculturalism 
in practice; one country, Indonesia, is a developing, religious (Muslim- majority) 
country; the other, Australia, is a prosperous, broadly secular, Western coun-
try. In Indonesia, religious identity is a matter of public acknowledgement and 
a compulsory aspect of citizenship. In Australia, religious identity is a matter 
for the individual, and freedom of religion is understood as “providing a ‘nega-
tive freedom’ from [state] interference in religious belief or worship” (Coleman 
and White, 2006:8). These two countries can be said to embody the complexity 
and plurality of the contemporary religious landscape.
With more than 300 ethnic groups and 700 living languages, Indonesia is 
one of the most culturally and linguistically diverse countries on earth. There 
are officially only six religions in Indonesia. According to the 2000 census, 
86% of the population follow Islam, 6% follow Protestantism, 3% Catholicism, 
2% Hinduism, and a smaller percentage Buddhism (CIA, 2011); since 2006, 
Confucianism has been an officially recognized religion. An estimated 20 mil-
lion persons practise animism and other types of traditional belief systems 
(Oslo Coalition, 2008). All citizens must identify their affiliation with one of the 
six religions in documents required by government, e.g. in birth and marriage 
certificates. Recent changes allow an empty space for ‘religion’ in the national 
ID card (KTP). The first sila or principle in the Pancasila, which is the state 
ideology, is belief in one supreme God. Thus, Indonesia is neither a secular 
state nor an Islamic state, but it is a religious state.
Although the national motto is “Unity in Diversity”, during Suharto’s rule 
(1966–1998), the main method of dealing with ethnic and religious plurality 
was largely to pretend it did not exist. Assimilation into a national culture 
was the dominant discourse in Suharto’s Indonesia (Foulcher, 1990; see also 
Mujibarrahman, 2006: Chapter 5). After the interminable 32 years of New 
Order government under Suharto, Indonesia almost seemed to erupt in 
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 ethnic-religious violence (Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002). It patently failed 
to uphold its national motto, as trouble-spots flared in ugly violent conflict: 
there were attacks on the Chinese in several towns and cities, ethnic violence 
in Central and West Kalimantan, religious and ethnic conflict in Poso,  Lombok, 
Halmahera, Ambon, and elsewhere. And there were continuing separatist 
movements in East Timor, Papua and Aceh.
Democratization and decentralization effectively strengthened ethnic and 
regional identities (Aspinall and Fealy, 2003). Democratization opened the 
way for expression of tension, and decentralization meant that there was 
plenty to fight for: local elites played up tensions within communities in their 
own self-interest (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010). With the economy in disarray, 
analysts began to worry about national disintegration as well as rising religious 
extremism in Indonesia.
Over a rather longer period, since the 1980s, Islamization has produced a 
more Islamic public space in Indonesia (Fealy and White, 2008). While Islam 
is very diverse in Indonesia, and there is a continuum from tolerant modera-
tion to terrorism (Barton, 2004; van Bruinessen, 2002), neo-fundamentalism 
emerged as an important force in Indonesian society. Although Islamist terror-
ism is the prism through which the Western media have mainly represented 
Indonesia since 2002, inside the country the trend has been towards more 
scrupulous observance of the five pillars of Islam and a much more public 
expression of piety.
While Indonesia post-1998 is a much more open and democratic society 
than under Suharto, the version of multiculturalism that prevails now is 
circumscribed — there are restrictions on religious belief and non-belief, and 
on religious identity; there is lack of tolerance for minority groups of various 
types (e.g. some religious minorities, atheists and secularists, some ethnic 
minorities, people of alternative sexualities) and an “absent state” (negara 
absen) when it comes to protecting minorities; there is continuing racism 
towards some minorities, such as the Chinese and Papuans; a largely secret 
war has been waged in West Papua over some decades, and there are still 
occasional outbursts of ethno-religious violence in some other areas; and the 
declaration of syariah (Islamic law) in some districts has particularly restricted 
women’s freedom and mobility. On the other hand, religiosity is assumed; 
the state recognizes as public holidays the holy days of the six religions; 
and religions are taught in schools, in the confessional mode. Indonesia is the 
sort of nation-state that puts the lie to secularization theory: Indonesian 
modernity is plural and democratic, but religious; differentiation has not 
placed religion in its own box, nor has religion been ascribed a role only in the 
private sphere.
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Simultaneous with democratization, and to some extent in reaction to the 
greatly enhanced media freedom, there has been a swing towards intolerance. 
There were mass protests and counter-protests from 2006 over a proposed 
anti-pornography law (Allen, 2009). In 2005, MUI (the Indonesian Council of 
Ulama) prohibited Muslims from praying with non-Muslims; in 2005 they 
issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from marrying non-Muslims and outlawed 
the Islamic minority sect, Ahmadiyah, and pluralism, secularism and liberal-
ism in general (Gillespie, 2007); in 2008 came the Joint Ministerial Decree 
which prohibited members of Ahmadiyah from proselytizing (Crouch, 2009). 
Furthermore, the construction and building of religious worship places have 
increasingly become a site of controversy and dispute, as highlighted in the 
recently published monograph, Disputed Churches in Jakarta (see Ali-Fauzi 
et al. 2012).
Although the Constitution accords “all persons the right to worship accord-
ing to their own religion or belief ”, it does not accord the right not to be reli-
gious. However this “freedom of religion” is circumscribed by the first principle 
of the national ideology of Pancasila, which states a belief in one supreme God. 
Thus, atheism, animism and polytheism are not permissible in Indonesia. 
Atheism was stigmatized during the Suharto regime when an atheist was auto-
matically assumed to be a communist who warranted exclusion from the 
national community. More recently, the state’s position towards atheism is 
being put to the test with the imprisonment of a 30-year old self-declared athe-
ist under charges of blasphemy, disseminating hatred and spreading atheism 
(The New York Times, 21 May 2012).
Thus, although Indonesia can be said to already have religious citizenship, 
in regard to these latter issues Indonesia suffers from a lack of state support for 
religious and non-religious minorities. We return to consider religious citizen-
ship in Indonesia in a later section.
In Australia, as in many Western countries, there have been two main ways 
to “deal with” minority, usually immigrant cultures: the assimilation of minor-
ity cultures to the dominant majority culture, as in Australia under the White 
Australia Policy, or some sort of multicultural policy, which challenges the 
authority, dominance and even existence of a homogeneous national culture. 
This latter has been the case in Australia, as government policy, since about 
1982. In 1989, a statement of policies and goals entitled National Agenda for 
a Multicultural Australia received bi-partisan political support (Department 
of Immigration and Citizenship, 1989). This policy aimed to manage issues 
raised by the cultural diversity of Australia — including “problems and injus-
tices” such as the “disproportionate number of non-English speaking back-
ground (NESB) immigrants [who] remain confined to low skilled, low-paid 
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 employment” and the fact that “Many NESB women face additional problems 
of poverty, isolation and cultural tensions and conflict about the appropriate 
place of women in society” (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
1989). This Agenda did not mention that there were any problems of religious 
conflict or injustice that needed to be addressed.
While the Australian Constitution and laws guarantee freedom of religion, 
and multicultural policy, such as the National Agenda, explicitly outlaws dis-
crimination on the grounds of religion, the Judeao-Christian underpinning of 
the Australian nation-state is explicit and undeniable.7 “[I]ts civil society and 
political culture have been profoundly influenced by religious belief. Indeed, 
the religious heritage has been so ubiquitous as to be largely taken for granted” 
(Galligan and Roberts, 2004:201). For instance, Australia says it will treat all 
citizens equally, but the only religious public holidays that it recognizes are 
Christian ones. The hegemony of “white”, Anglo-Saxon/Judeao-Christian cul-
ture tends to hide the interests and grievances of the followers of minority reli-
gions: “the state’s tolerance is a tolerance [of ] major religions in the 
Christian-Judaic tradition and . . . it will over-ride the impact of believers’ views 
where it regards those views as departing from what it considers community 
values” (Coleman and White, 2006:9). Thus, while Australia resoundingly 
trumpets its tolerance of diversity, it clearly demands “an overriding and unify-
ing commitment to Australia, to its interests and future first and foremost . . . in 
the interests of social cohesion and justice” (Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, 1989).
We propose that in Australia, multiculturalism as explicit government pol-
icy and as dominant public discourse has neglected religion and religious 
minorities, to its peril. Against a backdrop of the growing population of Mus-
lim immigrants, in 2001 three events occurred that brought to a climax a gener-
ally rising tide of anti-Muslim feeling: first was an alleged gang rape in Sydney, 
second was the events of September 11, in New York, and third was the arrival 
of around 440 mainly Afghan refugees who had been given shelter by the 
7 In 2009, the Rudd government introduced a new Citizenship Test for immigrants who want 
to become citizens. The booklet of testable information that prospective citizens have to learn 
states, in a section entitled “Freedom of religion and secular government”, that Australia has a 
“Judaeo-Christian heritage, and many Australians describe themselves as Christians. Australia 
has public holidays on Christian days such as Good Friday, Easter Sunday and Christmas Day. 
However, the government in Australia is secular. This means that there is no official national 
religion. People in Australia are free to follow any religion they choose, as long as its practices do 
not break Australian laws. In addition to Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and 
many other religions are practised freely in Australia. Australians are also free to not follow a 
religion. The government treats all citizens equally, whatever their religion or beliefs” (Australian 
Government, 2009:18).
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Norwegian vessel, the Tampa, and were refused entry by the conservative 
Howard government.
Australia, usually seen as a multicultural success story, saw some ugly 
attacks on Muslims: some women wearing veils and headscarves were vili-
fied and attacked; Arabic newspapers and other institutions received death 
threats; some Islamic schools had to be temporarily closed after they and their 
pupils were attacked; and mosques were the subject of attacks (see Rutland, 
2006:24–25 for further references). Fortunately such episodes did not esca-
late, though some episodes of inter-cultural conflict, such as the Cronulla 
riots, have anti-Islamic nuances (Noble, 2009). Nevertheless, there has been 
something of a shift away from multiculturalism in Australia, which lines up 
with a retreat from multiculturalism in many countries in Western Europe 
(Phillips, 2007:4–8).8 Currently, a fortress mentality is obvious in Australia’s 
treatment of asylum seekers who arrive by boat. It is very unfortunate that 
the issue has become politicized, with the two major political parties engaged 
in a “race to the bottom” in their unsympathetic rhetoric about “illegal immi-
grants”. The other, more long-standing problem area for Australia is the under-
class status of its Indigenous People, who continue to experience dramatically 
different standards of health and well-being to those enjoyed by the rest of the 
nation. Aborigines are adversely affected by generations of trauma (e.g. caused 
by the government policy of separating Aboriginal children from their parents 
and communities — the “Stolen Generations”), racism, social exclusion and 
poverty, as well as dispossession.
Those two issues aside, Australia has made solid progress on creating a har-
monious and stable society from its diverse population mix. From a unique 
public television, radio and online media station, SBS, which broadcasts in 
many different languages, to migrant community centres, inter-faith organiza-
tions and inclusive public schools, Australia has implemented a huge range of 
pro-diversity policy initiatives that broadly seem to have worked.
8 In October 2010, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, declared that multiculturalism had 
“utterly failed” in Germany. This was largely due to its inability to accommodate religious others 
(read: Muslim Turks), among other problems such as unemployment and social integration (BBC 
News Europe, 2010). Similarly, in February 2011, the British Prime Minister David Cameron and 
the French President Nicolas Sarkozy both denounced state multiculturalism as a “failure” (BBC 
News UK Politics, 2011; Reuters UK Edition, 2011). In reply to these European statements, the 
Immigration Minister in Australia, Chris Bowen, reiterated his government’s support for 
multiculturalism, stressing that the difference between multiculturalism in these Western 
European countries and in Australia was that Australia “respected different cultures, but afforded 
ultimate primacy to Australian values” (The Australian, 2011). Up until this statement in February 
2011, the Gillard government was not considered to be pro-multiculturalism.
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However, in the academic discourse on multiculturalism in Australia, reli-
gious diversity is neglected in favour of cultural and ethnic diversity. Most 
 academic books on multiculturalism theory and diversity fail to address 
religious diversity. A recent book, titled Everyday Multiculturalism (Wise 
and  Velayutham, 2009), barely mentions religion. A standard text on human 
resource management for Australian university students, Managing Diversity 
in Australia: Theory and Practice, mentions the word “religion” only twice: the 
second instance follows these sentences: “. . . we will map the contours of diver-
sity in Australian workplaces. To do this, we will use the criteria of race, gender, 
age, ethnicity and disability. These are the main criteria that are of interest 
to the Australian Human Rights Commission (ARHC). These are not the only 
contours of diversity that could be examined; other dimensions include reli-
gion, sexuality and locality” (Strachan et al., 2010:20).
Rethinking Australian Citizenship (Hudson and Kane, 2000) devotes 
separate chapters to a wide range of “differential citizenships” possible in 
 Australia — indigenous citizenship, social citizenship, cultural citizenship, 
multicultural citizenship, feminism and citizenship, environmental citizen-
ship. The idea of religious citizenship is not entertained. Hudson later (2003) 
elaborated that “citizenship is different on different sites and in different con-
texts and domains; different citizenships involve multiple capacity; exercises 
of civic capacity do not fall under a single citizenship; and not all citizen-
ships can be totalized by reference to nation-state citizenships” (2003:426). 
Such an understanding of citizenship allows for scope to imagine a new sort 
of citizenship based on religious identity. Hudson’s idea of differential and 
heterogeneous citizenships suggests that religious citizenship could be con-
ceptualized as being of quite a different order. He identified five definitions 
for religious citizenship: nation-state, civil society, human rights, legal docu-
ments, and reflexive account (2003:426–427). For a country such as Australia, 
we suggest exploring the potential for religious citizenship in civil society: “the 
citizenship that religious persons can exercise in the civic sphere” (2003:426). 
We suggest that in Australia, functional differentiation (arguably the most 
accepted component of secularization theory), in concert with privatization 
(in the sense that religiosity should be confined to the private world), have 
progressed to the extent that there is a lack of space for religious people to 
exercise their citizenship in the public sphere. This is particularly the case 
for people of minority religions. Later we propose that education is one area 
where the expression of religiosity could be publically explored.
The point we want to make here is that academic discourse of multicultural-
ism, in Australia, and worldwide, does not adequately theorize religion nor 
does multiculturalism policy in Australia adequately acknowledge religious 
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identity. We are not just talking about economic injustices, such as high unem-
ployment rates among migrant minorities: we think that countries like Austra-
lia need to do some hard thinking about meaningful symbolic recognition, 
non-Christian religiosity, minority religious identities and how they can be 
better included in communities and “mainstream culture”.
However, we also want to acknowledge some potential problems with “reli-
gious citizenship”. One problem is that the discourse of religious tolerance 
tends to be conducted among religious elites (Rutland, 2006:26). Brown (2006) 
has written of the way “tolerance talk” has discursive effects — producing a 
privileged, superior class of individuals, who deem themselves the tolerant, 
secular, civilized mainstream, in contradistinction to people (commonly mobs) 
who are deemed the irrational, fanatical, extremist or fundamentalist Other. 
“Tolerance is generally conferred by those who do not require it on those who 
do” (Brown, 2006:186). Secularists hold themselves superior to the religious, 
and this conceit legitimates intolerance of non-liberal states and patriarchal 
minority religions (Brown, 2006:7; Parker, 2007; Parker, 2011).
We see this phenomenon commonly played out in multiculturalism discourse 
and practice in Australia: only ethnic minorities have culture or  religion — the 
dominant white culture does not appear as culture, and secularity appears as 
a neutral, objective “fair go”, when in fact it fails to identify the needs of reli-
gious minorities. As Brown notes, this discourse of civilized tolerance reeks 
of Orientalist imperialism: secular, Western democracies enjoy human rights 
and celebrate cultural diversity, and therefore have the right to “stand[] for the 
expansion of human liberty” in fundamentalist countries such as Afghanistan 
(President Bush, 18 May 2004 as cited in Brown, 2006:177). In other words, “toler-
ance” invokes the power of the powerful to define the barbarism of the religious, 
ethnicized, irrational Other. We have to recognize the potential of tolerance in 
religious citizenship to become an instrument of power, and we need to pay 
attention to the process of negotiation and power play between the state and 
civil society when conceptualizing any kind of religious civic citizenship.
The identification of religious tolerance as a discourse of power has a history. 
Secularization theory is a part of that history. Asad has discussed how, through 
the post-Reformation period in Europe, “religion” came to be regarded as a 
thing in its own right — and that enabled its domestication by the state 
(1993:206–207). “Religion” came to be seen as a force which elicited passions 
and beliefs that were irrational. It became something that had the power to 
threaten public order and the state. Religion also became “part of what is 
inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality. More 
strongly put: religion is what actually or potentially divides us, and if followed 
with passionate conviction, may set us intolerantly against one another” (Asad, 
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1993:207; italics in original).9 This, of course, is the crux of “differentiation” in 
secularization theory — the development of separate spheres, and the 
relegation of “religion” to its own little sphere.
The secularity of some Western countries is often seen by religious people as 
explicitly not neutral. Muslim people commonly see the banning of the Mus-
lim head-scarf as a partisan, illiberal attack on their religious freedom and right 
to express their religiosity. This signals that the West, while posing as the 
upholder of universal values such as tolerance and human rights, does not 
always practise what it preaches; neither does it have a monopoly on tolerance 
and human rights.
Religious Citizenship
With increasingly complex and plural identities emerging from globalization, 
new concepts of citizenship are urgently needed to accommodate such diver-
sity within (and beyond) the nation-state. Conventionally, citizenship is under-
stood as a legal status, an administrative category and a political practice that 
accounts for one’s membership, rights and obligation to a political community 
(Stokes, 2008). However, as we have seen, the discourse of citizenship has 
evolved and extended into areas beyond the legal and political, to include civil, 
cultural and social areas — thus the emergence of new expressions such as 
“multi-cultural citizenship”, “corporate citizenship”, and “ecological citizen-
ship”. The concept of “cultural citizenship” was employed by Rosaldo (1999) to 
expand the idea of citizens’ rights based on class to citizenship issues of gen-
der, race, sexuality, ecology, and age. In his view, disadvantaged, marginalized 
and disenfranchised subjects deserve full citizenship in spite of their cultural 
difference from mainstream society. This concept was subsequently deployed 
and fine-tuned by Ong (1999) to refer to the cultural practices negotiated out of 
ambivalent and contested relations with the state, that establish the criteria of 
belonging within a national population and territory. Drawing from Rosaldo 
and Ong, Winarnita (2008) defines cultural citizenship as performance and 
expression of national belonging through engagement in social, cultural and 
9 Some theorists of secularization see science as one of the chief driving forces for 
secularization. While we agree theoretically that science seems to be antithetical to religion as a 
way of explaining the world, we would note here the failure of secularization theory to recognize 
the human capacity for contradiction: science and religion can and often do co-exist, both at the 
level of the individual and in society. For instance, many apparently well-educated Christians 
accept creationism, and many Muslims who believe that Allah created the world explicitly 
advocate that Muslims should accept Western technology and science.
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political issues, even in the absence of legal or formal citizenship. The forego-
ing discussions suggest that citizenship is more than a legal status or adminis-
trative category and includes political practice, as well as a mode of participation 
in public life (Stokes, 2008). Membership of and participation in religious 
 non-governmental organizations and religious institutions could be consid-
ered acts of religious citizenship.
Nevertheless, a crucial question is the role of the state. While the classic 
nation-state notion of citizenship (passports, patriotism and gold medals) is 
not adequate to cater for the radically different potential claims of religious 
citizenship, we cannot ignore the nation-state. Religious citizenship would 
have to accommodate, be accommodated by, or sit side-by-side with the 
nation-state; it would have to recognize and engage citizens’ emotions which 
are bound up with the nation-state: intense feelings of belonging, of hurt and 
injustice at being marginalized, treated as second-class citizens or dispos-
sessed, mixed pride-and-disappointment, patriotic expectations and hope; 
simultaneously it would have to offer a new moral authority, certainty, dignity 
and prosperity; as well as achieve international acceptability, recognition and 
status. This is a tall order! Iran is an extreme example, and we are not advocat-
ing replication, nor religious revolution — but we do support the exploration 
of other, more inclusive ways to operationalize religious citizenship.
A stark contrast to the case of a strong, Islamic state is one where the state is 
weak, as in the case of post-Suharto, Muslim-majority Indonesia. As discussed 
earlier, although Indonesia has a form of religious citizenship, we maintain 
that its version of religious citizenship is not ideal. The state’s role in the treat-
ment of its religious citizens is far from consistent. On the one hand, the Con-
stitution allows religious freedom; on the other hand, the state assumes a 
monopoly in defining what constitutes religion and only recognizes six reli-
gions. Furthermore, the state fails to protect religious minorities like Christians 
and the followers of the Islamic sect, Ahmadiyyah. For instance, on 6 February 
2011, three Ahmadis were publicly lynched by Islamic hardliners in West Java; 
a day later a mob burned down three churches in Central Java, in an unrelated 
case of outrage against an unsatisfactory court sentence against a Christian 
man accused of proselytization and blasphemy (Bush, 2011); in Aceh, where 
syariah is the prevailing system of law, the Banda Aceh administration closed 
Christian churches and Buddhist temples in October 2012 (Saragih, 2012). Such 
incidents point to increasing intolerance and violation of religious freedom. 
Sadly, the state has taken little action on such attacks on religious minorities. 
In broadly Christian areas of Papua, the influx of Muslim domestic migrants is 
changing the ethno-religious landscape such that many Papuans feel they are 
becoming a minority in their own land.
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An ideal multiculturalism, with true religious citizenship, in Indonesia 
would see not the “negative freedom” advocated in liberal Australia but explic-
itly pro-active government intervention on the side of minorities, to protect 
their right, enshrined in the Constitution, to “worship according to their own 
religion or belief ”. It would see the acceptance of minority group identity 
where there is currently racism and stigma; the peaceful settlement of the 
Papua problem; and the rule of law where currently there is corruption, confu-
sion and legal competition. As Modood argues, “Multiculturalism is clearly 
beyond toleration and state neutrality for it involves active support for cultural 
difference, active discouragement against hostility and disapproval and the 
remaking of the public sphere in order to fully include marginalized identities” 
(Modood, 2007:64).
In Australia, sometimes religious minorities require recognition and 
accommodation — for instance, for public holidays, houses of worship and 
some religious practices — and sometimes they would prefer anonymity. Since 
September 11, Australia has enacted new laws like the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005, 
and successive governments have found it in their electoral interest to take a 
hard line against asylum-seekers. While these measures do not explicitly target 
Muslims, they are commonly perceived, by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to 
construct Muslim-ness as suspicious and threatening.10 Sometimes the high-
handed control of religion and of national borders and citizenship comes at 
the cost of a breach of human rights. This is the case with Australia’s mandatory 
detention of asylum seekers. Clearly nation-states have to strike a balance 
between protection of the basic human right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion (as in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and 
protection of citizens from terrorist attack, but we also need some new ways to 
think about religious identity in a citizenship context. Australia has barely 
begun to take seriously the particular religious and legal needs of its Indigenous 
People, and there is clearly room for improvement by governments in Australia 
in their accommodation of immigrant religious needs and identities. However, 
we consider that the greatest need in Australia as far as religious citizenship is 
concerned, is to foster awareness among the dominant secular elite that 
religious people have a basic human right to practise their faith. There has 
been an enormous shift in social awareness about the rights of people of 
alternative sexualities in Australia and a growing awareness of the privilege 
enjoyed by heterosexuals — for instance, in everyday language, there is a 
strong trend to use “partner” instead of “husband” or “wife”. We would like to 
10 It is ironic that many asylum seekers in Australia are refugees from wars in countries like 
Afghanistan waged by the US, with Australia its loyal ally. 
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see an analogous trend in acceptance of religiosity and of the practices of 
religious people, and especially of people of minority religions.  
Actions that promote religious citizenship should be different in each 
country, as our two examples show. Kymlicka, in advocating for a liberal 
multiculturalism, argues that liberal citizens should put in a “conscientious 
effort to . . . see how issues look from the point of view of those with differing 
religious commitments and cultural backgrounds” (2001:297). The teaching of 
such “civility”, he believes, is primarily the responsibility of civil society, namely 
the church, family, on the street, and in neighbourhood shops (2001:298–302). 
Religious citizens can draw on their religious capital and values of peace, 
respect and love to pursue a “common good”, which can be found in most 
religious traditions, and is accessible for both religious and secular citizens. 
Such pursuit of a “common good” enables members of a common polity to 
build bridges and enter into dialogue with each other despite their differences 
in religion, ethnicity or culture.11
Religious Citizenship Education
Education is potentially a site for the fostering of a tolerant and enquiring 
attitude towards religious diversity. It is widely recognized that school plays 
an important role in shaping the character traits and dispositions of students 
and in preparing a new generation for their responsibilities as citizens (Kym-
licka, 2001; Weisbrod, 2002; Weinstock, 2004). Many countries are explicit 
that among the aims of their education system is the aim to produce good 
citizens. For instance, in Indonesia, the Education Act of 2003 stipulates that 
the aim of education is to produce Indonesians who have a “belief in God the 
Almighty and . . . high morality, good health, knowledge, intelligence, cre-
ativity, independence, and would be democratic and responsible citizens” 
(Soedijarto, 2009).
Citizenship education has been practised by most countries, with varying 
foci depending on national ideology. In arguing for religious citizenship educa-
tion as a global necessity, Miedema argues,
all children in all schools should have the full possibility to develop in a substantial 
way (that is not only cognitively but also experientially and practically) their religious 
identity as part of their broader identity; and all schools should be obliged to foster a 
11 For a discussion on how religious institutions, in particular, the Christian church, can facili-
tate political participation and promote participatory citizenship, see Weithman (2002) and 
 Rasmussen (2012).
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religious dimension to citizenship, and thereby bring about mutual respect and under-
standing. (2006:967).
However, in state schools in many broadly secular countries today, religion is 
either absent or relegated to a second-class (i.e. non-examinable) subject sta-
tus. This is the case in Australia. Religious people who are unsatisfied with such 
arrangements may enrol their children in segregated religious schools, “partly 
in order to teach their religious doctrine, but also to reduce the exposure of 
their children to the members of other religious groups” (Kymlicka, 2001:303). 
Kymlicka has identified some of the problems with such schools, including the 
inadequate education in citizenship. He argues that citizenship education is 
more than knowledge of political institutions and constitutional principles but 
should be education about how we deal with people who are different from us 
in their race, religion and class. He further contends that segregated religious 
schools, which tend to be homogeneous in their ethnocultural backgrounds 
and religious beliefs, are unlikely to be able to teach students how to live with 
“differences” (2001:304). Like Kymlicka, Miedema expresses doubt that segre-
gated religious schools can adequately prepare students for encounter and dia-
logue with adherents of other religions (2006:969).
While there is some evidence that supports both Kymlicka and Miedema’s 
reservations (see for example, Hoon, 2009), other research on religious schools 
suggests otherwise (Halstead and McLaughlin, 2005; Parker, 2010a; Raihani, 
2012). These scholars recognize the potential for religious schools to become 
significant sites of multicultural citizenship education wherein citizenship 
rights are taught and cultural and religious differences are welcomed and val-
ued. The caveat is that, more often than not, it has been individual educators, 
rather than the schools as a whole, who have promoted multicultural and 
inclusive education on citizenship (Parker, 2010b; Raihani, 2012). Halstead and 
McLaughlin make the important point that religious schools can provide stu-
dents with distinctive values that equip students to evaluate others’ values 
(which can, and indeed should, include disapproval) and also provide students 
with reasons to go on to place higher value on other integrative social values 
such as tolerance and “civic respect” (2005:70). This means that such schools 
are engaged in some quite subtle and nuanced work of creating secure identi-
ties in their students as well as building strong communities of empathetic citi-
zens committed to the common good.
We recognize that the introduction of religious citizenship education would 
bring its own policy and curriculum questions (see, for instance, Barnes, 2009; 
Kymlicka, 2001). Nonetheless, we would like to see both state and private reli-
gious schools teaching students how to live with “differences”, including reli-
gious differences, and not just in a token or ritualistic way. We would borrow 
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from Ninian Smart and argue that the study of religions should be both 
“polymethodic” and “poly-religion”: students in all schools should be taught to 
“take religion seriously”, to study more than one religious tradition and to have 
their students engage in active, participatory tolerance education (1995).
We would opt for a “non-theological” and “non-confessional” paradigm to 
direct teaching and learning in religious education, with students engaging in 
active, participatory tolerance and interfaith education. Religious citizenship 
education should attract students’ attention through the discussion of every-
day life issues (such as courtship, friendship, pre-marital sex, abortion, circum-
cision, cross-religious marriage) and not be afraid to challenge students with 
the big questions of religious philosophy (students can discuss the existence of 
God, or the afterlife). It should acknowledge the differences, uniqueness and 
competing truth claims of different religions, as well as the faith of religious 
followers, and respect their cherished particularity and superiority. Such edu-
cation would attend to peaceful, everyday co-existence and recognize the right 
of religious freedom (for a guide on how such a curriculum can be designed 
and implemented, see Engebretson, 2009). The aim of such religious citizen-
ship education would be to foster understanding of religious difference beyond 
stereotypes, similarities and conventional ritualistic behaviour, enabling stu-
dents to “negotiate with the perspectives of ‘others’ and integrate such per-
spectives into their own actions and reflections” (Miedema, 2006:975).
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to reflect critically and productively upon the 
secularization thesis. The events and wash of the 9/11 Islamist attacks on the 
US, as well as the “furiously religious” condition of the world at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century (Berger, 1999b:2), indicate the need for fresh 
analysis of “religion” in the world. We briefly surveyed the recent trend of 
religious resurgence in the contemporary world and, through analysis of the 
religious situation in the religious nation-state of Indonesia and the broadly 
secular, multicultural nation-state of Australia, we argued the need for new 
analysis of the meaning and scope of religion in state-society relations. We 
contend that multiculturalism policy has to take religion seriously, as does 
multiculturalism theorizing. We agree with Nökel and Stauth that there is “a 
need to open the secular public to the possibility of religious inclination, that 
is, a need for communication on the basis of difference to be acknowledged” 
(2005:362) and propose that some consideration be given to new modes of 
“religious citizenship” within the framework of multiculturalism. Finally, we 
propose that religious citizenship education in schools has potential as a site 
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where a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity might be 
encouraged.
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